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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article redefines the law of rape. It reconstructs the law, starting with the
elements of the crime. This Article is the logical result of various reform efforts,
most notably the Michigan statute,' but is identical to none of them. It focuses on
the defendant's mens rea, eliminating the inaccurate and redundant use of force
requirement, and consequently vindicates the concept of sexual autonomy.
Hardened veterans of rape reform efforts will likely either guffaw loudly, or
will have stopped reading by now. They recognize one inevitable fact: the law
can only do so much.2 It can redefine rape, but it cannot reshape attitudes. The
law can promote intellectual consistency, but it cannot ensure that all crime
t J.D. expected May, 1999, The Ohio State University College ofLaw. This Article would not have been
possible without the contributions of many individuals. I especially thank Professor Douglas Berman, without
whose support, willingness and ability to engage in prolonged discourse, and review of countless editorial and
revisional changes, this Article would not be nearly what it is. Professor Sharon Davies and Sharona Byrnes
also offered valuable comments. Finally, the thoughtftil and evocative discussions from the students in
Professor Alan Michaels's 1996 Criminal Law class germinated many of the ideas expressed herein.
1. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520a-.5201 (West 1991). The Michigan statute, passed in 1975,
enacted sweeping reform in the realm of rape law. It eliminated the element of consent, and concentrated only
on the defendant's actions and mental state. Commentators at the time called it "the most important model for
reform." Leigha Bienen, Rape III - National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
RPTR. 171, 172 (1980). While it has been criticized for keeping the element of force, it has also been praised for
shifting the inquiry away (at least in theory) from the victim, and toward the actions and mental state of the
defendant. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1147-57 (1986).
2. The wave of rape reform efforts in the 1970s and 1980s failed, by and large, to produce any
demonstrable increase in arrests or convictions. See Estrich, supra note 1, at 1157-61 (citing various studies
that indicated little quantifiable change, despite statutory reform). The only statistically significant change
seemed to be in Michigan, but the data collection somewhat obfuscated the true results, see id. at 1160, 1184
n.242, prompting the conclusion that "the law has very little impact on the system's approach to sexual assault
cases." Id. at 1160.
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law can promote intellectual consistency, but it cannot ensure that all crime
victims are treated fairly. Ultimately, rape law reform is an intellectual exercise. It
is an exercise performed in the hope that attitude will follow action. That is the
true goal of this Article. It will not cure the ills manifested in law enforcement,
prosecutorial, and judicial circles whenever rape law is implicated. Perhaps,
though, it will encourage examination of a subject that remains one of criminal
law's worst-treated. If this Article creates a pattern for a new statute, or at least
gets people wondering why the law of rape is so inconsistent with that of other
crimes, it will have accomplished a major feat.
Currently, the law against rape is in shambles. It has the wrong focus, casts
its net both too widely and too narrowly, and yields inconsistent results. The
common law definition, "carnal knowledge of a woman by force and without her
consent, ' 3 has impacted many current statutes, codifying and exacerbating the
problems above. First, rape law's focus often ignores the culpable mental state,
or mens rea, of the defendant, in favor of examining whether the prosecuting
witness consented to the act.4 This can, and often still does, result in the practice
of scrutinizing the prosecuting witness's sexual history. This practice has no
logical relevance to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Because of rape law's
misguided focus, it casts its net too widely, ensnaring defendants with no
culpable mental state.5 Rape law also casts its net too narrowly. Many states still
require the state to show that force was used in compelling the prosecuting
witness's compliance. This practice fails to recognize the existence of non-
violent means of coercion, and thus exculpates defendants whom society would
justly prefer to convict. 6 Finally, results of rape trials are inconsistent, due largely
to the nebulous definitions of the elements of the crime.
The law of rape has the wrong focus because it centers on the prosecuting
witness's conduct. In civil actions, voluntary participation by a plaintiff in the
challenged activity often constitutes a complete defense. This is not true in
n.242, prompting the conclusion that "the law has very little impact on the system's approach to sexual assault
cases." Id. at 1160.
3. Timothy W. Murphy, A Matter of Force: The Redefinition of Rape, 39 AF. L. REV. 19, 19 (1996)
(citing Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376 (1870)).
4. See People v Pugh, 667 N.YS.2d 465, 467 (1998) (mentioning "victim's sordid past upon which she
was extensively cross-examined" in the defense's effort to show she had traded sex for drugs).
5. See State v. Reed, 479 A.2d 1291, 1296 (Me. 1984) ("The legislature .. clearly indicated that rape
compelled by force or threat requires no culpable state of mind.").
6. See Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1164-65 (Pa. 1994) (holding that complainant,
who had a bad back and was outweighed by 60 pounds, must have fought the defendant off for him to be
convicted of first-degree rape).
7. See CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 24-39 (2d ed. 1980). It may be
argued that there are rare exceptions, such as the principle of unconscionability in contracts. Note, however,
that proponents of that principle often require the plaintiff to have been at some type of significant disadvantage
in negotiations, thus limiting any true voluntariness on the plaintiff's part. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§1345.03(B)(1) (considering, in the unconscionability calculus, "[w]hether the supplier has knowingly taken
advantage of the inability of the consumer reasonably to protect his interests because of his physical or mental
infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy, or inability to understand the language of an agreement"); see also Melvin
Aaron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 752 (1982) ("[M]uch of the
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criminal law, wherein we seek the defendant's state of mind to determine
culpability.8 The aims of criminal law are different from those of contracts or of
torts. While all seek to deter particular conduct, criminal law also seeks to
determine whether an accused party is morally blameworthy and, therefore,
guilty.9 Thus, crimes can and do exist which hold a defendant culpable even
though all participants are willing. 10 Society has determined that an act is
criminal only when reproachable, and is reproachable only when the defendant is
in some way responsible for its commission."
Clearly, then, rape law's focus on the prosecuting witness's conduct has
neither parallel nor justification. It is tangential to the basic inquiry: did the
defendant have a culpable mental state, the required mens rea, to be convicted of
a heinous crime?
By similar reasoning, current rape law casts its net too widely, ensnaring
defendants with no culpable mental state. The primary concern is often the
prosecuting witness's state of mind. 12 It is easy, therefore, to envision a case in
which the prosecuting witness doesn't communicate that state of mind to the
defendant. He,' 3 then, cannot have acted negligently, recklessly, knowingly, or
scholarly literature and case law concerning unconscionability has emphasized the element of unfair surprise, in
which a major underpinning of the bargaining principle-knowing assent-is absent by hypothesis.").
8. See AMERICAN LAw INSTrrTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part I, at 229 (1985)
("[Section 2.02 of the Model Penal Code] expresses the Code's basic requirement that unless some element of
mental culpability is proved with respect to each material element of the offense, no valid criminal conviction
may be obtained .... ).
9. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING 10 (3d. ed. 1994) ("Today, a number of
states have identified punishment or the meting out of 'just deserts' as the central objective of their sentencing
laws."). Again, some may point to the extraordinary remedy of punitive damages in torts as an example of a
finding of civil blameworthiness. Inquiries into the awarding of punitive damages substantially mirror that of
criminal culpability. See, e.g., Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center, 635 N.E.2d 331, 342 (Ohio 1994)
(stating that defendant's malicious intent must be shown for court to award punitive damages). Thus, the
exception proves the rule: actions taken to punish must stem from a finding of moral blameworthiness.
10. So-called "victimless crimes" include prostitution, drug use, suicide, and sodomy. For arguments
discussing the proper legal status of "victimless crimes," see Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone,
145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 55 n.269 (1996) (presenting both libertarian rationales against, and political collectivity
arguments for keeping "victimless crimes" illegal); Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and the
Weakness of Public Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2593, 2593-96 (1994) (claiming that drug prohibition increases the
violent nature of crime, costs too much to enforce, and increases corruption of public officials); Martha
Chamallas, Consent, Equaliy and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 826-30
(1988) (arguing that no theoretical or practical basis exists for keeping prostitution illegal).
11. But see United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). Defendant Dotterweich was found guilty
of introducing adulterated or misbranded drugs into interstate commerce. While Dotterweich seemingly
approves of crimes in which "consciousness of wrongdoing [is] totally wanting," as the corporation president
and general manager, Dotterweich had "at least the opportunity of informing [himself] of the existence of
conditions imposed for the protection of consumers." Id at 285. Even here, it seems, a form of
blameworthiness was imputed to the defendant.
12. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 263 (West 1988) ("The essential guilt of rape consists in the outrage
to the person and feelings of the victims of the rape.").
13. Because of the statistical realities of the crime of rape, this Article will refer to defendants in the
masculine, and to prosecuting witnesses in the feminine. See The National Victim Center, Sexual Assault and
Rape Statistics (visited Feb. 21, 1998), <http://www.nvc.org/edir/rapestat.htm#vc> (showing that, as of 1994,
94.1 % of rape victims were women); Donald Dripps, et al., Men, Women and Rape, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
125, 128 n.29 (1994) (citing studies which show the prevalence of women as rape victims); Brande Stellings,
Note, The Public Harm of Private Volence: Rape, Sex Discrimination, and Citizenship, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
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purposefully.14 Yet such a defendant may be found guilty if the law pays heed
not to his culpable mental state, but rather to the prosecuting witness's state of
mind. 1
Rape law today inculpates the prosecuting witness as well. The law's
obsession with the state of mind of the woman has led to the irrelevant and
maligned courtroom tactic of placing her sexual history at issue. 16 Although
most states, 17 and the federal government, 18 now have "rape shield laws," this
has not ended the practice. 19 Indeed, such laws have been challenged as violative
of the defendant's right to a fair trial and his right to confront the witnesses
testifying against him.2 °
At the same time, current rape law casts its net too narrowly, acquitting those
defendants who might otherwise be found guilty. Some states include force or
the threat of force as a necessary element of the crime, presuming the victim is
L. REv. 185, 186 n.3 (1993) (citing various studies estimating that rape victims comprise from 90-99.4%
women).
14. Of course, strict liability offenses do exist, but for the most part do not include imprisonment as a
possible punishment. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part I, § 2.05, (noting that the
Model Penal Code does not "abrogate strict liability completely, but... provide[s] that when conviction rests
upon that basis the grade of the offense is reduced to a violation [which carries no jail time].").
15. Such cases exist beyond the merely hypothetical. See, e.g., People v. Barnes, 721 P2d 110, 110-13
(Cal. 1986) (focusing on prosecuting witness's beliefs, which defendant asserted led to his reasonable belief in
prosecuting witness's assent).
16. Some commentators have argued that, so long as male bias remains in the judiciary, a mens tea
element will always be misapplied:
Concentrating on the defendant's mens rea as to consent may bring back another nightmare: the
survivor's sexual history.... Traditionally, the premise underlying the use of this type of evidence
has been that unchaste women are liars and should not be believed. A more recent premise is that if
a woman previously consented to sex, she likely consented this time.
Lynne Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 193, 214 (1988). On the other
hand, Estrich maintains that it is the lack of culpability analysis that leads to the examination of the defendant's
sexual history. See Estrich, supra note 1, at 1099-1100 ("[T]he inquiry into the victim's nonconsent puts the
woman, not the man, on trial. Her intent, not his, is disputed; and because her state of mind is key, her sexual
history may be considered relevant ... ").
17. Forty-nine states have either a statute or a rule of evidence limiting the admissibility of a prosecuting
witness's prior sexual history during a rape trial. See James A. Vaught & Margaret Henning, Admissibility of a
Rape ictim 's Prior Sexual Conduct in Texas: a Contemporary Review and Analysis, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 893,
928 n.10 (1992); Pamela J. Fisher, Comment, State v. Alvey: Iowa's 'ctimization of Defendants Through the
Overextension of Iowa's Rape Shield Law, 76 IOWA L. REv. 835, 895 n. 10 (1991) (listing the 49 states and
their respective rape shield statutes or rules of evidence). Arizona, the only state without such a statute or rule,
follows a common law rule limiting the admissibility of such evidence. See, e.g., State ex rel Pope v. Superior
Ct. of Arizona, 545 P.2d 946 (Ariz. 1976) (restricting use of prosecuting witness's prior sexual history for
evidentiary purposes).
18. See FED. R. EvID. 412.
19. See State v. Everidge, 702 So.2d 680, 685-86 (La 1997) (holding that exclusion of evidence of
prosecuting witness's prior sexual history with defendant was reversible error); State v. Johnson, 908 P.2d 770,
775 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd, 944 P.2d 869 (N.M. 1997) (reversing defendant's conviction on the grounds
that evidence that prosecuting witness had previously engaged in prostitution should have been admitted); State
v. Rooker, 1993 WL 120580 at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (discussing defense attorney's attempts, prior to
state's objection, to suggest past sexual activity on part of 13-year old prosecuting witness).
20. See, e.g., Shawn J. Wallach, Note, Rape Shield Laws: Protecting the Victim at the Expense of the
Defendant Constitutional Rights, 13 N.YL. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 485 (1997); Fisher, supra note 17, at 835-37,
868.
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21conscious, competent to give or withhold consent, and of a given statutory age.
The inclusion of force as an element of rape is fallacious because it is an indirect,
inaccurate way of assessing the real issue-the communication of the woman's
nonconsent to the sexual act. This has historically been the reason for the
requirement of a showing of force to convict.22 Yet it is neither the best way, nor
even a particularly accurate way, to accomplish this task.
23
Finally, current rape law produces results that cannot be reconciled with one
another and outcomes that most people would find unsavory. In a recent
unreported case in Florida, the defendant was acquitted, despite the prosecution's
contention that he held his victim at knifepoint while raping her. Jury members
21. States can be divided into three broad categories: (1) those that require force to be used for all rape-
type convictions; (2) those that require force for felony convictions but not for misdemeanors; and (3) those
with no force requirement at all.
(1) Force required:
Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103 (Michie 1993)), California (CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1988)),
Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1 (Harrsion 1972)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 18-6101 (1997)), Illinois (720 ILL.
CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-13 (West 1993), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1 (West 1986)), Kansas (KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3502 (West 1995)), Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.040 (Michie 1990)),
Massachussetts (MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 265, § 22 (Law. Co-op. 1992)), Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.520b (West 1991)), North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2 (1997)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1111 (West 1983)), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ti. xvi, § 153.375 (1991)), Rhode Island (RI. GEN.
LAWS § 11-37-2 (1994)), S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-652 (Law. Co-op. 1976)), South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-22-1 (Michie 1988)), Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (Michie 1996)), West Virginia (W. VA.
CODE § 61-8B-7 (1997)), Wisconsin (WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.225 (West 1996)), and Wyoming (WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-302 (Michie 1997)).
(2) Force required for a felony, but not for a misdemeanor offense:
Alabama (ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61 (1994)), Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70, 53a-73a (West
1994)), Maryland (MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 464c (1994)), Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-320 (1995)),
New York (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20 (1998)), Texas (Ttx PENAL CODE ANN. § 528 (West 1994)), and Utah
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402 (1995)).
(3) Force not required (i.e. a felony can be charged without force having been used):
Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410 (Michie 1996)), Arizona (ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406 (West 1991)),
Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-403 (1979)), Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. fit. xi, § 773 (1995)),
Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(c) (West 1992)), Hawai'i (HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-730 (1985)), Iowa
(IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West 1993)), Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.43.1 (West 1997)), Maine
(ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 255 (West 1983)), Minnesota (MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.3451 (West 1987)),
Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-95 (1994)), Missouri (Mo. STAT. § 566.040 (1979)), Nevada (NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366 (Michie 1997)),New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(1996)), New
Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 1995)),New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-90-1 (Michie
1978)),North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-07(1997)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2907.03 (Banks-
Baldwin 1997)), Pennsylvania (18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124.1 (West 1983)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-505 (1997)), Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (1974)), and Washington (WASH. REV.
CODE § 9A.44.060 (West 1988)).
22. See Estrich, supra note 1, at 1130-32.
23. The courts have shown themselves to be uncomfortable with the force requirement. In State v. Rusk,
43 Md. App. 476 (1979), for example, although the record shows no indication that the defendant made any
verbal threats, the fact that he "lightly choked" the prosecuting witness was sufficient to fulfill the force
element. Ohio courts have expressed their discomfort with the statutory requirement of force by all but
judicially eliminating it for cases in which the defendant and prosecuting witness are related. See State v.
Schaim, 600 N.E 2d 661 (Ohio 1992) (stating per se rule that the issuance of a command by a father to his
daughter implied punishment and threat of force if the command were not followed); State v. Eskridge, 526
N.E.2d 304 (Ohio 1988) (initiating variable standard of force, depending on relationship between parties, as
well as age, weight, and physical strength differential); State v. Fowler, 500 N.E.2d 390 (Ohio 1985) (finding
sufficient force to support rape charge by man telling his 14-year old stepdaughter not to tell anyone about their
intercourse).
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were interviewed by the media after the trial. The jury foreman stated, quite
candidly: "We felt she asked for it the way she was dressed.... The way she was
dressed with that skirt, you could see everything she had. She was advertising for
sex." 24 Presumably, the jury found that the defendant believed the act to be
consensual, based upon his observation of the prosecuting witness's clothing.
Conversely, in People v. Barnes,25 the defendant's beliefs were never examined.
The prosecuting witness testified that she felt threatened by the defendant's
statements and actions, including his "displaying the muscles in his arms,"
"'lectur[ing]' her," and "look[ing] at her 'funny."' After intercourse, the
prosecuting witness fell asleep in the defendant's home. She reported the
incident to the police the day after that. The defendant was convicted at trial of
rape. This conviction was overturned at the appellate level, and later re-instated
by the state Supreme Court. Unlike the court in Florida, the Barnes court looked
exclusively at the prosecuting witness's desires, regardless of her success or
effort at communicating them to the defendant.
Clearly, then, a new definition of rape is in order. This Article offers the
following as a model statute:
Rape:
1) Sexual Intercourse
2) With negligence toward the prosecuting witness's will.
DEFINITION: If the prosecuting witness verbally refuses sexual
intercourse, the defendant has acted negligentlyper se.
This statute makes several conceptual changes, each of which will be discussed.
Section II discusses current concepts in rape law, as described in prominent
scholarship. Section III argues that the prosecuting witness's actions are largely,
albeit not completely, irrelevant and must therefore be given limited attention
relative to the defendant's mens rea. This reduction of the inquiry results in the
elimination of force as an element of the crime and the per se unreasonableness
of the admissibility of a defendant's sexual activity in the face of the prosecuting
witness's verbal refusal. Section IV will develop the statute's second element,
arguing the appropriateness of a reasonable man standard. To be convicted of
rape, the defendant must be shown to have acted negligently toward the
prosecuting witness's willingness. Section V will expand on the idea that the
force requirement is not a helpful indicator either of a lack of consent, or of the
defendant's mental state, concluding that it must therefore be relegated to the
role of an aggravating circumstance. Finally, Section VI will summarize the new
definition of rape, and, by applying it to difficult cases, show how it mitigates
and eliminates existing problems with the law.
24. Jury Woman in Rape Case "Asked for it", CHICAGO TRIB., Oct. 6, 1989 at 11. The incident
occurred in Fort Lauderdale, Florida
25. 721 P.2d 110 (Cal. 1986).
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II. PAST AND CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP
Much of the literature has focused on an accurate indicator of when a woman
consents to intercourse. In common law, courts required the defendant to have
used physical force to overcome the will of the prosecuting witness.26 Often, to
prove that the woman truly did not consent, she had to "resist to the utmost"
against her attacker,27 even to the point of endangering her safety beyond the
implications of the sexual assault.28
Such definitions of consent struggled with finding a balance between
protecting women against crime, and protecting men against false accusations of
rape. That the latter played an exceedingly important role in the formulation of
the common law is well-documented. 29 Thus, many courts used manifestations
of physical resistance by the victim as a substitute for lack of consent.3° Upon
the assumption that a virtuous woman would defend her virtue until physically
overcome, 31 courts made the counter-assumption that failure to resist implied
consent. The need for resistance, of course, implies that force must be present as
a target for that resistance. By extension, then, for the victim not to have
consented to intercourse, the defendant must have used force.
Professor Estrich attacks this concept on many grounds. Primarily, she
asserts that prevailing notions of force and resistance in criminal law are male-
driven. That is, the law recognizes "force as most schoolboys do on the
26. See CASSIA SFOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM 21 (1992) (defining the common law of
rape as "carnal knowledge of a woman, not one's wife, by force and against her will").
27. Id at 17.
28. See State v. Muhammad, 162 N.W.2d 567, 568-70 (Wis. 1968) (holding that victim who was
pinned, with defendant's hand placed over her nose and mouth so that she was unable to breathe, did not resist
sufficiently for defendant to be convicted).
29. See Reidhead v. State, 250 P. 366, 366 (Ariz. 1926) ("[W]hen a verdict of guilty is returned on the
evidence of the prosecutrix alone, her story must be reasonable, consistent, and not inherently impossible or
improbable to a degree that would make it incredible to the ordinary man."); Witt v. State, 233 P 788, 788
(Okla. Crim. App. 1925) ("[Rape] arouse[s] the passions and prejudices of jurors, and for that reason... [if]
there is inherent evidence of improbability or indications that the prosecution is maliciously inspired, the court
should not permit a conviction to stand."); I MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635
(1778) ("Rape is... an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the
party accused, tho never so innocent.").
30. See State v. Colestock, 67 P. 418, 420 (Or. 1902) ("The importance of resistance is simply to show
two elements in the crime-carnal knowledge by force by one of the parties, and nonconsent thereto by the
other."); Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent
Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 66 (1952) ("When her behavior looks like resistance although her attitude is one of
consent, injustice may be done the man by the woman's subsequent accusation.").
31. See People v. Dasey, 242 P 876, 878 (Cal. Ct. App. 1925) (refusing to overturn the trial court's
instruction that victim must resist to the utmost at all times in order to avoid presumption of consent); 2 JOEL
PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 625 (7th ed. 1882) ("[Tlhe will of the woman must
oppose the act, and.., any inclination favoring it is fatal to the prosecution."); IRA M. MOORE, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE IN CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE AND IN
COURTS OF RECORD IN THE STATE OF ILLINOIS § 435 (1876) ("Nature had given [the prosecutrix] feet and
hands with which she could kick and strike, teeth to bite, and a voice to cry out, All these should have been put
in requisition in defense of her chastity.").
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playground: Force is when he hits me; resistance is when I hit back. ' 32 What the
law of rape fails to recognize, says Estrich, is that force may be perceived and
responded to in various ways, some of which are primarily gender-specific.
Where a court of male judges may expect that a nonconsenting party would be
overcome only by force, a female in a threatening situation may simply say "no,"
and cry as she is penetrated.33 The common law's failure to recognize the range
of possible responses to force makes force an imperfect substitute for
nonconsent.
Compelling as Estrich's argument is, it is not the most compelling one for
eliminating the use of force as an element of rape. To make her point, Estrich
must rely on her contentions of sexism in the law.34 To accept her argument, one
must believe that men and women perceive different situations as threatening,
and respond, by and large, differently to those situations. While this may seem
intuitive, it is not provable. It can be accepted only insofar as we believe the
testimony of the prosecuting witness after the alleged sexual assault. In other
words, to accept Estrich's argument, we must believe that a prosecuting witness
really did not consent to intercourse, often with her word as the only indicator of
the truth of her statement. Yet it is the common law's distrust of her word which
the force requirement initially sought to address. It is no answer to say that we
believe her because men and women are different, and that we know this to be
true because women tell us so.
Lest the reader now regard this work with utter distaste, be assured that I
come to the final conclusion that "no means no," and that the act of sexual
intercourse in the face of verbal refusal is criminally culpable. But if we are to
32. Estrich, supra note 1, at 1105.
33. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470, 486 (N.C. 1984). In People v. Jansson, 323 N.W.2d 508,
511 (Mich. 1982), after the victim said she did not want sexual intercourse, the defendant pulled her to the
ground, took her clothes off, and penetrated her. Although the record showed no use of force beyond that, the
victim stated that she was frightened, did not know what to do, and did not physically resist.
In State v Rusk, 406 A.2d 624 (Md. 1979), the dissenting judge quoted extensively from a report
prepared by the Battelle Memorial Institute:
Perhaps because most women's experience and expertise with violence tends to be minimal, they are
unlikely to engage in physical combat or succeed when they do. Many women employ what is
referred to as "passive resistance." This can include crying, being slow to respond, feigning an
inability to understand instructions or telling the rapist they are pregnant, diseased or injured. While
these techniques may not always be successful, their use does suggest that the victim is surely not a
willing partner.
Id. at 634 (Wilner, J., dissenting) (quoting Rape and its 4ctims: A Report for Citizens, Health Facilities, and
Criminal Justice Agencies, L.E.A.A. (1975)).
34. Those contentions are, of course, well-supported. As Professor Martha Field points out:
[The law's presumption that the prosecuting witness is lying] is buttressed by nothing more
substantial than a view that women are foolish creatures who do not have a good grasp of reality.
"Fantasies of being raped are exceedingly common in women, indeed one may almost say that they
are probably universal ..." As late as 1970, a respected law review, without any empirical support,
declared: "Women often falsely accuse men of sexual attacks to extort money, to force marriage, to
satisfy a childish desire for notoriety, or to attain personal revenge. Their motives include hatred, a
sense of shame after consenting to illicit intercourse, especially when pregnancy results, and
delusion."
MARTHA A. FIELD, Rape: Legal Aspects, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1336, 1361-62 (Sanford H.
Kadish ed., 1983) (citations omitted).
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achieve an intellectually honest result, the issue must be addressed logically and
dispassionately. We cannot find refuge in answers that seem intuitive and are
socially palatable, but logically circular. Only if the logic is clean can it achieve
ultimate acceptance, and, hopefully, codification in law.
A better argument points out the obfuscation caused by using force as an
element. As shown before, force is commonly used as a surrogate for
nonconsent. But those statutes which include force as an element evince a clear
redundancy by also including nonconsent. 35 These statutes betray a failing that
appears throughout the common law as well: a failure to define nonconsent in a
meaningful way.36 Despite this definitional failing, courts and legislatures have
retained nonconsent as an element, and sought to rectify the problem of its
nebulous definition by maintaining a requirement of force. In effect, the element
of nonconsent appears twice: once as nonconsent, and again as the use of force.
What results is a confusion between the element and the method of proving it. If
an element of the crime of rape is victim nonconsent, then proof of nonconsent,
properly defined, should be dispositive. Force need not and ought not enter into
the elemental equation, except as proof of the element of nonconsent.
Professor Dripps points out another problem with the dual requirements of
force and nonconsent. Regardless of the use of force, if a jury finds consent, then
no crime has occurred.37 Dripps cites State v. Lord, discussed previously, as an
example.38 In Lord, the defendant was acquitted, despite having threatened the
woman with a knife, because she was found to have dressed provacatively,
implying her consent. If the criminal law examines the defendant's mens rea and
his conduct, then a jury's inference of consent by the victim should not be
dispositive. Otherwise, examination into the conduct of the woman becomes the
logical consequence of the conjunction of force and consent.
The fact that the common law has used force as a model for nonconsent
implies that force itself is not the fundamental harm the law of rape seeks to
address. If it were, so much time and energy would not be spent explaining why
force shows the prosecuting witness's lack of desire. The use of force would be
enough, without it having to imply anything else. Rape would be merely a form
of assault, aggravated by the concurrent sex act. No jurisdiction defines rape as
an aggravated form of assault.39 Therefore, the use of force to obtain sex is
somehow different than the use of force alone, and it is different because some
harm other than assault has been inflicted on society.
There are two possibilities to explain this. The first is that sexual intercourse
by force is worse than the use of force alone, implying, as discussed above, that
35. See supra note 21 for a list of rape statutes.
36. See RicHARD A. POSNER & KATHARiNE B. SILBAUGH, A GUiDE TO AMERICA'S SEX LAWS 6 (1996)
(discussing lack of definition in rape statutes).
37. See Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force
and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1793-94 (1992).
38. For information on this unreported case, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 21 for a list of rape statutes.
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assault is a lesser-included offense of rape. Sexual intercourse would be an
aggravating element of assault. The second is that rape is different than assault,
incomparable, and constitutes a wholly separate offense. This implies that rape
causes a harm to society that is different than the mere use of force. If this is true,
then force is not an integral part of the harm of rape, because otherwise rape
would be one aggravated crime on a spectrum of assault crimes.
I suggest that rape is different than assault, and that rape can therefore be
committed without force. I further suggest that the fundamental harm of rape lies
in the removal of choice from the victim, and in the influencing of that choice by
whatever coercive means the actor may employ.40 The means do not define the
harm. The means are merely the implement by which the harm is caused, and the
harm may be caused independently of the means employed.
Therefore, if nonconsent can be defined properly, it should be sufficient to
convict. The definition of nonconsent must incorporate inquiry into the
defendant's mens rea and it must also be defined in such a way that the law
protects not only bodily integrity, but the right to refuse sexual activity as well.
III. A DEFINITION OF NONCONSENT
This section begins to develop the definitions necessary to construct a new
rape statute. Notions of consent, and communication of nonconsent are explored
first. As opposed to "willingness," which I address in Section IV, "consent" is the
prosecuting witness's verbal agreement to have sex. The "definition" section of
the statute, given in Section I, comprises the nonconsent element.
To create a usable definition of consent, it is necessary to understand what
the law of rape seeks to accomplish by its inclusion of nonconsent as an element.
Estrich contends that nonconsent must protect the sexual autonomy of women-
the right of women not to engage in sex. In her view, the law must shield
women from unwanted sexual activity, and at the same time leave them free to
engage in sex, with a willing partner, in a manner of their choosing. "[A] consent
standard," says Estrich, "that allowed the individual woman to say 'yes' as well
as 'no,'... would be a means of empowering women. 42 Dripps, on the other
hand, maintains that the relativeness of sexual autonomy makes it impossible to
evaluate morally, and, therefore, impossible to implicate criminally
43
Dripps proposes that bodily integrity should be analogized to property, and
40. Analogously, robbery is usually defined as the taking of another's property by force or fear. See, e.g.,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Force is therefore not necessary for a robbery to
have occurred.
41. Professor Dripps refers to this as "negative sexual autonomy," as opposed to "positive sexual
autonomy." The latter would exist in a world where anyone could have sex with anyone else of their choosing,
without the right of the other to refuse. Obviously, it is the right to say "no" that the law of rape protects. See
Dripps, supra note 37, at 1785.
42. Estrich, supra note 1, at 1132.
43. See Dripps, supra note 37, at 1788-92.
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that the purpose of the law should be to protect this property interest.44 His
theory is problematic on a number of levels. The analogy, of course, is not
complete, as other authors have pointed out. Bodily integrity is not like
property, 45 and is not alienable in the same way. Also, the law presumes against a
charitable donation of property,46 yet the intangible benefits of meaningful sex
foreclose such a presumption in that arena. Furthermore, Dripps' use of bodily
integrity as property implies no requirement of physical contact; there is no
logical distinction, in Dripps' definition, between the voyeur who expropriates a
view of the victim's body, and the rapist.
47
Both Estrich and Dripps come to the same conclusion when they both insist
that "no must mean no,",48 and this conclusion is clearly correct. What is not
clear is the right or interest that this rule would legitimize. I think the ultimate
answer must lie in the woman's right to say no, and the law's infusion of that
statement with the power of criminal consequence. If this is the same as sexual
autonomy, so be it. While it is not within the realm of the criminal law to dictate
how sex should be conducted, it certainly may proscribe certain conduct. Laws
of assault and extortion prohibit forcible and coercive conduct, for the mere
reason that they are undesirable and wrong.49 Arguments may be made about
property rights, autonomy, or ultimate benefit to society, but the real, visceral
reason for these laws is that people have a right to refuse interactions with others.
It is, as Brandeis put it, the "right to be let alone" 50 that the law protects, and the
coercive violation of that right that the criminal law must punish.
Once it is agreed that "no" must mean "no," it follows that a defendant who
ignores the proper communication of that preference must be found culpable.
Otherwise, further inquiry would imply that no sometimes means yes, if only we
can find a certain set of circumstances.
This has been rape law's consistent quagmire. A nagging suspicion remains
44. See generally Dripps, supra note 37.
45. See Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1921-25 (1987) ("Thinking
of rape in market rhetoric implicitly conceives of as fungible something that we know to be personal, in fact
conceives of as fungible property something we know to be too personal even to be personal property. Bodily
integrity is an attribute and not an object.").
46. See, e.g., WILLIAM P. HOGOBOOM & DONALD B. KING, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: FAMILY LAW
8-513 (1997) (stating that, generally, donative intent must be proved by specific facts such as the donor's
declarations).
47. See Dripps, supra note 37, at 1806 n.60.
48. See Dripps, supra note 37, at 1804 ("The substantive law ought to punish the disregard of the sexual
object's words, without regard to their sincerity.[.. T]he intent that matters should be the intent to engage in
sex with a person who says she refuses."); Estrich, supra note 1, at 1127 ("Were the purpose of the consent
requirement really to afford autonomy to women, there is no reason why a simple but clearly stated 'no' would
not suffice to signify nonconsent.").
49. Many examples exist in criminal law of distinctions that are made without any apparent
underpinning in rights or privileges. Yet these distinctions are rarely argued because there is societal agreement
that they should exist. For example, United States Sentencing Guidelines add two levels to a kidnapping
sentence if the victim was elderly. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1. l(b) (1997). Yet there is
no clear argument that an elderly person has a greater right or privilege against kidnapping than anyone else.
The guideline is fueled by our sense of moral outrage, not by an articulatable distinction.
50. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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that women really do mean "yes" when they say "no,"51 at least sometimes, and
so there is the consequent fear of convicting an innocent man. If the premise is to
be believed, then the fear is a real one. If a woman cannot be trusted to say what
she means, then a conviction on the basis of her word could truly be viewed as
unjust.
A close examination of these concerns reveals two underlying issues: the
man must be placed on notice about the woman's nonconsent and he must be
protected from a lying accuser. Works expressing concern about false
convictions generally deal with one or both of these issues.52 Because the matter
of the lying prosecuting witness is more easily dealt with, it will be addressed
first.
As mentioned before, the concern about a lying accuser is dealt with properly
by the normal requirements of conviction. The need for proof beyond a
reasonable doubt adequately addresses the case of the lying prosecuting
witness.53 Even assuming against the evidence that rape complainants have a
higher incidence of false reporting than do complainants in other crimes,54 there
is no reason to expect that such claims will be believed by juries any more
51. None of these same sources propose that women also say "yes" when they really mean "no."
Apparently, women's ambivalence was always presumed to mask sexual desire, and not a lack thereof. See,
e.g., Note, supra note 30, at 67-68 (stating "where such an attitude of ambivalence exists, the woman may,
nonetheless, exhibit behavior which would lead the factfinder to conclude that she opposed the act ...
[F]aimess to the male suggests a conclusion of not guilty, despite signs of aggression, if his act was not
contrary to the woman's formulated wishes.").
52. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (defending the corroboration
requirement as "a particular implementation of the general policy that uncertainty should be resolved in favor of
the accused."); SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 43-47 (1987) (giving examples of jurists and scholars who
believed women either didn't know what they wanted, or lied about it afterward); SPOHN & HORNEY, supra
note 26, at 24 ("Traditional wisdom, reflected in common law, held that rape should be treated differently from
other crimes because of the danger of false charges by vindictive or mentally disturbed women."); 3 JOHN H.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 924a (3d ed. 1940) ("No judge should ever let a sex-
offence charge go to the jury unless the female complainant's social history and mental makeup have been
examined and testified to by a qualified physician."); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 238
(2d ed. 1983) ("A little still she strove, and much repented/And whispering, "I will ne'er consent"-
consented") (quoting Lord Byron); Glanville Williams, Corroboration-Sexual Cases, CRIm. L. REV., Oct.
1961, at 662-71 ("[S]exual cases are particularly subject to the danger of deliberately false charges, resulting
from sexual neurosis, phantasy, jealousy, spite, or simply a girl's refusal to admit that she consented to an act of
which she is now ashamed."); Note, supra note 30 at 67-68; Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67
COLuM. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1967) ("Surely the simplest, and perhaps the most important, reason not to
permit conviction for rape on the uncorroborated word of the prosecutrix is that that word is very often false.").
53. See FIELD, supra note 34, at 1356 ("For the most part, both courts and state legislatures have come
to recognize that a special corroboration rule for rape cases is unjustified. Rape defendants, like other criminal
defendants, are fully protected by the general principle that guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
54. Reliable statistics on false reporting of crimes are hard to obtain, due to the nature of ascertaining
falsity. Data reported are generally estimates and range widely. One recent study estimated that five percent of
rape reports are false, not far from the two percent average for other violent crimes. See LINDA A. FAiRsTEIN,
SEXUAL VIOLENCE: OUR WAR AGAINST RAPE 228-29 (1993). Susan Brownmiller offers a frequently-quoted
statistic of only two percent false rape reports when female police officers are used. See SUSAN BROWNMILLER,
AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 410 (1975). The basis for this statistic may not be scientific, and
has come under recent attack. See David R. Throop, Refutation of Brownmiller s 'Only 2% are False' Claim
(visited Mar. 8, 1998) <http://ftp.vix.com/men/falsereport/refbrownm.html>. However, a more recent study
seems to lend support to the two percent statistic. See JULIE A. ALLISON & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, RAPE:
THE MISUNDERSTOOD CRIME 11 (1993).
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readily than any other,55 Lord Hale's admonition56 notwithstanding.
There will always remain those who, regardless, truly believe that rape
charges are somehow uniquely prone to falsification and erroneous convictions.
Although it will be cold comfort, the fact is that corroboration requirements were
of minimal effect anyway. Judges tended to interpret them narrowly, such that "a
scintilla of corroboration was satisfying.",57 Any legislative delineations of
corroborative proof would be doomed to failure-the multitude of cases, and the
infinite ranges of available, probative proof, defy cataloguing. Even when
corroboration requirements were removed, those jurisdictions experienced little
effect either way on conviction rates for rapes.58
In any event, it is far more consistent with other crimes to deal with the
matter on an evidentiary, rather than on a definitional basis. The corroboration
requirement for rape stood alone among crimes. 59 Given the system's usual
reliance on the reasonable proof standard, such evidentiary determinations are
rightly left to the jury.60 Those who assert otherwise should be required to have
substantial evidence at their disposal, for their desire to retain a corroboration
requirement for rape runs counter to the normal propositions of the law.
The issue of notice is more genuinely problematic. If, as I and others before
me have contended, "no" must mean "no," then the proper communication of
nonconsent must be sufficient for conviction. The only issue is how to determine
what constitutes proper communication.
Dripps is pessimistic about attempts to codify definitions of consent.61 His
outlook, though, is based on failings of two previous attempts. The first is that
most states have muddied the waters by including conduct-related language in
55. If anything, people tend to disbelieve charges of rape in disproportionate numbers. See Martha R.
Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 217, 230 (1980) ("[A
majority of adults sampled] think that 50% or more of reported rapes are reported as rape only because the
woman was trying to get back at a man she was angry with, or was trying to cover up an illegitimate
pregnancy."). An overwhelming number also disagree with Lord Hale's notion that rape is hard for a defendant
to disprove. See Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Tial in
Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1018 (1991) (citing study that shows from 65-98% of those
surveyed, depending on race and gender, believe that men can commit rape and readily get away with it).
56. See HALE, supra note 29.
57. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 26, at 162 (quoting ajudge who participated in the survey).
58. This is so because of the discretion built into the criminal justice system. Prosecutors will not indict
when they do not feel they can win a conviction. The existence of corroborative evidence plays a substantial
role in these determinations by prosecutors. Many officials believed that an explicit instruction to the jury,
explaining that corroborative evidence is not required for a conviction, would have a significant effect;
however, this has not been shown since many jurisdictions do not require such an instruction, and many
prosecutors do not request it. See id at 163-64.
59. See Dawn M. DuBois, Note, A Matter of lime: Evidence of a 4ctim 's Prompt Complaint in New
York, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1087, 1098 n. 70 (1988) ("Prior to rape corroboration rules, the testimony of a single
victim-witness was legally sufficient evidence upon which the jury could find a verdict.") (citing 7 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2034, at 259 (3d ed. 1940)).
60. See Kathy Mack, Continuing Barriers to Women s Credibility: A Feminist Perspective on the Proof
Process, 4 CRIM. L.F. 327, 332 (1993) ("The corroboration rules pertaining to women alleging rape contrasted
sharply with the usual common law rule that the jury was entitled to convict on the unsupported testimony of
one witness.").
61. See Dripps, supra note 37, at 1787 n.30.
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their definitions of consent.62 Dripps rightly criticizes this practice as failing to
advance the matter: if consent is defined in terms of conduct, the prosecuting
witness's actions will still figure prominently in the investigation, leading us
right back to the current mess. The second failing, as Dripps points out, is that
vague words given by the prosecuting witness lead to vague analyses. "Are 'oh,
all right' the kind of 'actual words' that manifest 'freely given agreement'?
63
This, as Dripps agrees, is not an insurmountable problem: a second element,
involving an independent examination of the defendant's mens rea, cures the
defect. If the words are ambiguous, we can take a "pass" on determining their
true meaning, confident that the second half of our inquiry will ensnare the
culpable and free the innocent.
This is the approach of this Article. Consent is defined broadly, analyzed
quickly, and soon dispensed with. In this way, minimal attention is paid to the
conduct of the prosecuting witness. Force is given to the woman's words, for
they are an undeniable, completely objective indicator of what she wants.
Therefore, consent must be defined as a verbal manifestation by the woman of
her desire for intercourse.
The matter, however, cannot rest there. We must determine whether consent
is truly an element of the crime of rape, or whether the relevant issue is
nonconsent. The difference is more than semantic. If we were to define consent
alone, and rape could be proved by a lack of consent, then a defendant could be
convicted upon proof of the woman's mere silence. Defining nonconsent as an
element, however, means that the woman must, in a positive way, 6 4 express her
nonconsent. Now the real issue becomes manifest: must a woman say "yes" for a
man to be absolved of rape? or must she say "no" for him to be convicted? And
what does silence mean? In other words, there are three possibilities for a consent
standard. At one extreme, the woman must verbally agree to sex for the act not to
be criminal. This would imply that silence on the part of the woman inculpates
the man. At the other end of the spectrum, the woman would have to refuse
intercourse verbally, and the man would then have to engage in intercourse with
her, for a crime to be committed. Under this rubric, silence would be exculpatory.
In arguing that a "yes" must be obtained for a defendant to be exculpated,
feminists have asserted that this is the only way to validate women's sexual
autonomy. If, the argument goes, the woman's consent is the issue, then it is her
perspective that determines whether the man acted culpably. 65 The only way for
a jury to be sure that the woman truly consented is if she positively agreed to
sex.6 6 Commentators have analogized to other crimes, as well as to property,
62. See id. (quoting the Washington statute, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(7) (West Supp.
1992)), providing that consent "means that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse there are actual words or
conduct indicating freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse" (emphasis added)).
63. Id.
64. By "positive," I do not mean "certain" or "unequivocal." I mean positive in the sense of a logical
positive: the negative communication must be effected by saying "no."
65. See Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, in DATE RAPE 25-26 (Leslie Francis ed., 1996).
66. See id.
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contracts and torts to show that a positive manifestation of consent is needed.
This argument fails on two important levels. To give effect to a woman's
words, we must be able to convict based on those words. To convict, an element
of the defendant's mens rea is necessary. This necessarily implies that consent or
nonconsent be examined from the vantage point of the defendant.
For commentators such as Lois Pineau, this syllogism may be far too glib. If,
as she contends, courts have historically implemented sexist, male-biased
notions of consent, examinations from the man's perspective merely perpetuate
the problem. Furthermore, if the woman's consent is the central issue, then
logically it is her perspective that must control.
Each of these points has been addressed. To answer Pineau, perceived male
bias in the judiciary (and society in general) is circumvented by an objective
standard. Consent must be defined such that, if the woman says "no," the
defendant is culpable. It is defined in terms of a presence of "no," and not an
absence of "yes," because, again, the defendant's liability, not the woman's
viewpoint, is the central issue. "Since the basis of criminal liability is
intentionally wrong or unreasonable conduct, fairness seems to require that we
do not disregard his viewpoint entirely., 67 Indeed, if the woman's words are
enough to convict, then consent has essentially been made a strict liability
element. That is, no mens rea element is necessary to convict if the prosecuting
witness said "no." The law presumes against taking away a person's freedom,
and we must therefore insist on proof so persuasive that no reasonable person
could have misconstrued-more, that no reasonable man could have done so.
The best and only way to do this is to require that the woman say "no" for the
defendant to fulfill the element of nonconsent.
It will be no answer that the man had an ongoing relationship with this
woman, that a dozen or a thousand times before, she truly meant "yes" when she
said "no." A man who proceeds under those circumstances does so at his own
risk, and the law will post no sympathy.
68
The second level on which Pineau's argument fails is its assumption on the
proper role of criminal law. Many people, I think, would support a law which
defines when sex is criminal; far fewer would support a law which dictates how
sex must occur. There is a logical difference. While "no means no" may be an
enforceable concept, "only yes means yes" is not. The latter defines the point
after which sexual intercourse would be criminal. The former creates a positive
requirement for sexual intercourse not to be criminal. Communication is an
intricate, imprecise matter, and although we seek to give effect to a woman's
words, we do not seek to limit the method of her expression so severely. As
Estrich says,
67. Catharine Pierce Wells, Date Rape and the Law: Another Feminist New, in DATE RAPE 44 (Leslie
Francis ed. 1996). In responding to Pineau, Wells gives a strong articulation of the preceding argument.
68. Professor Dripps puts it more eloquently: "The law should demand no more from anyone than the
expressed refusal to engage in sex, and should punish the disregard of that expressed refusal even if the
expressed refusal is proved by twenty bishops to have been insincere." Dripps, supra note 37, at 1804.
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[T]he consent standard could be viewed as a means to afford women
their deserved freedom to engage in sex however they choose.... The
harm of rape, or part of it, is the denial of that freedom. Indeed, a consent
standard that allowed the individual woman to say "yes" as well as "no,"
to define all the limits of permissible sex for herself and then to have that
definition incorporated and respected in law, would be a means of
empowering women.69
One who does not view a positive requirement for sex as beyond the scope of
criminal law must still consider the level of intrusiveness engendered by both
options. It is axiomatic that, effectiveness and other considerations held equal,
criminal law should limit the level of its intrusion into everyday life. 70 It is
obviously far more intrusive to place a positive requirement on every act of
sexual intercourse than to establish a negative limit on the (relatively infrequent)
acts of rape.
In summary, "consent" is defined as the verbal manifestation of the woman's
willingness to engage in intercourse. Criminal conduct occurs when the woman
has refused sex, and the defendant engages in sex with her in spite of this refusal.
Such continuance in the face of objective refusal is sufficient for conviction.
Since the law is defined in a way no reasonable person could fail to understand,7'
i.e. "no" means "no", the statute's definition section imposes a strict liability
69. Estrich, supra note 1, at 1132. I do not mean to imply that Estrich would agree with my conclusion
that silence should not implicate the defendant. I am quite certain she would not. See id ("The insistence that
men are entitled ... to presume consent from silence ... makes all too clear the law's absolute determination
not to empower women at all."). Despite her theoretical leanings, she regretfully admitted the reality of the
situation, at least as it was in 1987:
If we are not at the point where it is appropriate for the law to presume nonconsent from silence, and
the reactions I have received to this Article suggest that we are not, then at least we should be at the
point where it is legitimate to punish the man who ignores a woman's explicit words of protestations.
Id. at 1182. Perhaps Estrich would be satisfied with this Article's suggestion that silence not only fails to
implicate, but also demands a subsequent investigation into the defendant's mental state.
70. Those who hold this principal less than axiomatic will find an excellent argument for its support in
Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least
Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173 (1988). Strossen points out the erosions of the Fourth
Amendment caused by subjective "totality of the circumstances" and "reasonable means" tests and shows the
unprincipled nature of the Supreme Court's decisions in this area. Strossen notes that a "least intrusive means"
test is used in virtually all other types of constitutional analyses, such as privacy in one's bodily integrity,
procedural and substantive due process, free speech, association, freedom of the press, religious exercise,
political participation, right to travel, privileges and immunities, and the commerce clause. See id at 1210.
Furthermore, courts regularly limit the law's right to intrude upon the body and bodily functions. See also Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (requiring compelling state interest, embodied in a narrowly-drawn statute,
to overcome fundamental constitutional right to privacy); DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW
34-49 (1987) (discussing the public rights that place limitations on the coercive power of the state to enforce
criminal law); Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of
Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 588 n.505 (noting common law limitations on involuntary
blood and urine samples). The courts have often considered such intrusions as "a basic offense to human
dignity." Clancy, supra, at 588 n.505. (quoting Storms v. Couglin, 600 F Supp. 1214, 1224 (S.D.N.Y 1984)).
71. But see Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741, 785-87 (1993)
(discussing traditional judicial reluctance to strict liability crimes).
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element.72
IV. WITH NEGLIGENCE TOWARD THE WILL: THE SECOND ELEMENT
If the woman does not establish that she verbally refused intercourse, a
second element must be considered: what the defendant knew, or reasonably
could have known, about the woman's true wishes. I call the woman's true
wishes "willingness" in order to distinguish this subjective matter from the
objective consent standard.73 Therefore, "consent" is the woman's outward,
objective manifestation of her subjective, inward "willingness." "Willingness" is
subsumed in the second element of rape.
There will be times when the woman may be silent,74 give an ambiguous
response,75 or may say "yes" in an atmosphere of coercion.76 It should be
immediately intuitive that, while the fulfillment of the nonconsent element can
convict, its nonfulfillment does not necessarily exonerate. Any of the above
responses to a request for intercourse could be the result of coercion. Each must
be examined for culpability on the defendant's part.
This approach offers something to those who believe that sex is noncriminal
only when the woman has positively assented.77 While they may not grant the
72. In a way, nonconsent is a combination of strict liability and a reasonable man standard. By making it
a strict liability element, we make a per se judgment that no reasonable man could misunderstand a woman's
"no." The assumption of this proposition is critical. If it could ever truly be proven otherwise, the definition of
consent as a strict liability element would constitute a gross injustice. Furthermore, any jurisdiction
implementing this concept would be well-advised to publicize it, giving notice that words now have power and
give rise to legal consequence.
73. "Consent" is defined in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 210 (6th ed. 1991) as synonymous with
willingness. In civil law, "[c]onsent is implied in every agreement." Id. In the law of rape, a woman must
"resist to the point where further resistance would be useless or until her resistance is overcome by force or
violence" to be deemed as having not consented. Id. The considerations of the actions of the woman, and the
requirement of force, are of course the very propositions this Article seeks to overcome.
74. In United States v Booker, 25 M.J. 114 (1987), the prosecuting witness went to a motel room with a
group of Navy servicemen. The record shows she was intoxicated. After having sex with her companion for the
evening, she fell asleep on the bed. Each of the servicemen in the group, including the defendant, then
proceeded to have sex with her. At some point she woke up, and, during sex with the defendant, spoke the
name of her original companion aloud. The defendant maintained that, prior to her saying the name of the other
man, he had a reasonable belief in her consent to intercourse.
In its charge to the jury, the court instructed them on the nature of "implied consent." Said the judge,
"[Y]ou could imply that... [the victim] gave her consent by the way she moved her body around." Id. at 117.
In other words, silence could imply consent in this military jurisdiction.
75. The most famous example of an ambiguous response is Rusk, supra note 33. Pat, the prosecuting
witness, drove defendant Rusk home from a bar. Rusk left the car, and took her car keys from the ignition. Pat
testified that she unwillingly went to Rusk's apartment, where they had sex. Prior to intercourse, Pat asked
Rusk, "If I do what you want, will you let me go without killing me?" and "If I do what you want, will you let
me go?" Id. at 733. By the objective definition of this Article, this was not a situation of nonconsent. Pat never
said, "I don't want to have intercourse." Some courts, using Part M's definition of nonconsent, may find her
statements to have been a substantial equivalent. As will be shown in Part VI, however, this analysis falls more
properly within the second element. Rusk is also considered more fully in Part VI.
76. In an extreme example, Agard v Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 700-01 (2nd Cir. 1997), the prosecuting
witness testified that she "consented" to oral sex after being abused verbally and physically, and then watching
the defendant load a handgun in her presence when she offered resistance.
77. Some commentators assert that, because women are at a socioeconomic disadvantage, all sex is
nonconsensual. Sex, the argument goes, is the most valuable commodity a woman has to offer in a patriarchal
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ambiguity of silence, they must certainly concede that silence is less an indicator
of consent than positive agreement.78 Given the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and a reasonable man standard, it would be unacceptable to
convict on the basis of silence alone. Therefore, while the strict liability nature of
the nonconsent element requires a strict definition, it cannot be the end of the
story. The second half of the culpability decision must examine what the
defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, about the woman's
willingness.
In creating the second element, a mens rea requirement for the defendant, the
first step is to decide between an objective and a subjective test. Those who
argue for a subjective test may point to the vagueness of willingness issues as
making objectivity impossible. How, it may be asked, can we use an objective
standard when a woman can express willingness (even if not consent) in ways
other than words? 79 Some commentators simply find it facially unacceptable to
convict for rape without proving intent.80
Even granting that communication can be ambiguous, an objective standard
is still feasible. The use of a reasonable man standard affords protection to the
defendant, for the jury will be instructed to adopt a male perspective of
reasonableness. Yet it imposes reasonableness and societal standards8' on the
power structure. Therefore, even a woman who says "yes" accedes to the act only as a consequence of her
inferior bargaining position. See Robin L. West, The Difference in Women s Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenonological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW 115, 133 (Martha A.
Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen eds., 1991) ("If what we need to do to survive ... is have heterosexual
penetration three to five times a week, then we'll do it, and if the current ethic is that we must not only do it,
but enjoy it, well then, we'll enjoy it.").
78. Consistency demands this concession. If the feminist stance is that sex is consensual only when
positively agreed to, it must be so because the words have meaning. See, e.g., Cheryl Siskin, Criminal Law-
No. The "Resistance not Required" Statute and "Rape Shield Law" May Not Be Enough, 66 TEMP. L. REV.
531, 561 (1993) (arguing that a woman's verbalization of "no" should be sufficient for conviction). If a
woman's words have meaning, they must have more meaning than if she had said nothing. Furthermore, the
claim that conduct cannot be used to infer consent must also mean that conduct less persuasively implies
nonconsent as well.
79. Not all communication is verbal. How much is actually communicated non-verbally is a favorite
topic of popular culture. See, e.g., Wendy Martin, The Sexually Satisfied Woman, 222 COSMOPOLITAN, April 1,
1997, at 211 ("So how best to go about asserting and communicating your needs? If you're not comfortable
just telling your partner what you want, try body language."); see also The Heilbron Report, Report of the
Advisory Committee on the Law of Rape 10 (1976) (Cmnd. 6352), discussed in Dolly F. Alexander, Comment,
Twenty Years ofMorgan: A Criticism of the Subjectivist Kew ofMens Rea and Rape in Great Britain, 7 PACE
INT'L. L. REv. 207 (1995). The Heilbron Report was an English legislative study. It was commissioned after
the landmark case of Regina v Morgan, 2 All E.R. 347 (1975), to examine various issues of rape law. The
report concluded, among other things, that the complex nature of sexual relations required a subjective
standard of mens rea .
80. In Morgan, Lord Halisham wrote for the majority,
[T]o insist that a belief must be reasonable to excuse it is to insist that either the accused is to be
found guilty of intending to do that which in truth he did not intend to do, or that his state of mind,
though innocent of evil intent, can convict him if it be honest but not rational.
Morgan, 2 All E.R. 347, at 357. Lord Halisham rejected this possibility, because it was to him "abundantly
clear" that conviction could not be had without intent. See id. This circular reasoning assumes the answer to the
question, and does not advance the issue.
81. For different views about what constitutes societal attitudes, compare Douglas N. Husak & George
C. Thomas II, Date Rape, Social Convention, and Reasonable Mistakes, 11 LAw AND PHILOSOPHY 126
(1992) (arguing that it is "manifestly unjust" to punish persons whose "behavior is reasonable according to
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extremes of behavior.82
An examination of the history of rape law leads inevitably to an objective
test. The objective nature of the "consent" standard was directed partly at
circumventing demonstrable sexism within the criminal law system,83 and partly
at validating sexual autonomy.84 To use a subjective test for the defendant's
mental state in the second element would re-introduce the sexism that we have
striven so greatly to remove. It would prevent a jury from convicting a man who
honestly held unreasonable sexist beliefs. In failing to punish that
unreasonableness, it would allow its continuance at the expense of victimizing
women. It would mean that, no matter how clearly the victim communicated her
unwillingness (short of saying "no"), a defendant's honest mistake about what
she wanted would constitute a complete defense. Such honest mistakes may be
truly held, but they are nonetheless intolerable in a society that insists on
reasonable behavior in human interactions.85
There are also practical difficulties with a subjective test, or even an "honest
mistake" defense. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution requires that the
defendant be allowed to use the "honest mistake" defense without taking the
stand.86 This means that a jury would have to evaluate what the defendant
believed without his ever testifying about what he believed. Furthermore, in
practice, courts have circumvented the subjective nature of the test by asking
whether a reasonable person could have believed as the defendant claims he did.
If a reasonable person could have so believed, the courts have then made the leap
that he in fact did. This essentially collapses the subjective test into an objective
one, eliminating the subjective examination altogether.87 It results in a test that is
less strenuous than either a subjective or an objective one. As one commentator
has said,
existing conventions") with ESTRICH, supra note 52, at 101 (arguing that "[w]e can use the law to push
forward").
82. Even the strongest advocates of a subjective test hedge at the extremes. The Heilbron Report
concluded that a man should be convicted based on his own, individual culpability, not "the intention of a
purely hypothetical reasonable man." Heilbron Report, supra note 79, at 8. In so holding, the Heilbron Report
staunchly defended even stupid mistakes, so long as intent was not present. See id. Even so, the report
backpedaled significantly when it said that one should not be acquitted for an honest mistake "no matter how
ridiculous his story might be." See id at 11. This logically undercuts the rest of the argument. Used this way,
the term "ridiculous" is an objective standard, just as much as "reasonable" and "unreasonable" are.
83. Alternatively, it could be viewed as circumventing the entire question of whether such sexism exists
in the criminal justice system or not. For those who believe it does, the objective standard removes the feared
bias from the decisionmaking process. For those who believe sexism does not exist in the legal process, it at
least establishes a standard of notice so high that none but the most doggedly unenlightened could ignore it.
84. I admit a bit of queasiness at this latter proposition. It is not clear to me that the criminal law should
play a substantial, if any, role in such social engineering. Those who experience similar unease are directed to
the fact that circumventing sexism stands alone as a sufficient reason for an objective standard of consent.
Therefore, validating sexual autonomy may be viewed, by some, as a by-product.
85. Objective tests are used in virtually all other violent crimes. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, art. 210,
211, 212 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (defining crimes of criminal homicide, assault, and kidnapping).
86. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person... shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness
against himself .... ); Dana Berliner, Rethinking the Reasonable Defense Belief to Rape, 100 YALE L.J.
2687, 2694 (1991) (explaining practical difficulties with subjective standard).
87. See Berliner, supra note 86, at 2694-95.
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If the courts do not enforce the subjective element, the defense becomes
more available and more subject to manipulation; a defendant who did
not honestly believe the victim consented may nonetheless successfully
employ the defense if "hypothetically" someone else might have
reasonably believed consent was given.88
In such a case, the defendant need not have honestly believed in the woman's
consent; he need not even reasonably have believed in it, so long as someone
reasonably could have.
Regina v. Morgan8 9 is the most famous example of a subjective test gone
awry. Morgan, a Royal Air Force officer, convinced three enlisted men to go to
his home and have sex with his wife. The three later testified that Morgan had
told them not to worry if she screamed or resisted; she was "kinky," said
Morgan, and needed the violence to become excited. (Morgan denied this part of
the story). The four men took turns holding Morgan's wife down and having sex
with her, while she screamed, cried, and tried in vain to fight them off. She
reported the incident immediately afterward.
Morgan and his three co-defendants were convicted at trial. Upon review, the
House of Lords found that a reasonable belief in the prosecuting witness's
consent constituted a complete defense. Although the convictions were upheld,
the dangers of the subjective test are manifest. Morgan was a 3-2 decision. At
the trial level, the jury had been instructed that the defendants must have had a
reasonable belief in the prosecuting witness's consent to be acquitted. This was
held harmless error by the House of Lords, who ruled that no reasonable jury
could have believed that the defendants made an honest mistake. The House of
Lords' ruling notwithstanding, it is impossible to know how the jury would have
come out had they been instructed on the subjective test.
It is important not to attribute the denial of an "honest mistake" defense to a
concern about a defendant who might lie regarding what he believed to be true.
That would be equivalent to the previous supposition that the prosecuting
witness is lying, thus mixing elemental and evidentiary requirements. What is
really at stake are two central theories. First, at some point, a reasonable man
must be put on notice that his actions have become coercive. Criminal law
expects people to act reasonably, and may rightly punish them when they do not.
Second, as we have said, there are some acts of aggression and coercion so
beyond the pale of reasonableness that no "good faith" on the part of the actor
will acquit him.90
Some commentators have argued that, even if an objective test is to be used,
88. Id at 2695.
89. 2 All E.R. 347 (1975).
90. See, e.g., supra note 80.
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the "reasonable woman" inquiry is the correct standard. 91 Leaving the mens rea
difficulty of that position aside, for this has already been discussed, the
"reasonable woman" standard would not solve the problem of sexist jurists and
juries. If anything, it would exacerbate it, especially when the "reasonable
woman" is defined by male jurists.
92
While a reasonable man standard is also vulnerable to sexist judgments,
recall that this element is reached only when the verbal manifestation of consent
is ambiguous. The first element disposes of the easy cases; the second element
addresses the hard ones. Creating a "reasonable man" standard, while not a
perfect solution, substitutes societal norms for individual anomalies. Although it
remains subject to societal and institutional sexism, no standard (other than strict
liability) could ever eliminate those dangers completely.
Eliminating the defense of "honest mistake" sets the standard for mental
state at negligence de facto. Setting the bar as high as recklessness would mean
that the defendant would have to have been aware of the prosecuting witness's
unwillingness, and "consciously disregard[ed]" it.93 This requirement of
conscious disregard would imply the existence of an unreasonable "honest
mistake" defense. Therefore, the defendant need only act negligently with respect
to the prosecuting victim's willingness to be guilty of rape.
At this stage, a devil's choice becomes apparent. By focusing on the
prosecuting witness's actions, rape law brings her past into the courtroom. Yet by
focusing on the defendant's mens rea, and demanding reasonableness of him, the
defendant must be allowed to introduce evidence that would tend to show he
acted reasonably. This inevitably will bring the focus upon the prosecuting
witness's conduct, and such evidence will now be required for him to form a
defense. It must be agreed, from this choice between evils, that some such focus
upon the witness's conduct is inevitable. The use of a negligence standard
mitigates this somewhat, as those of her acts without reasonable implications
about her willingness will not exculpate the defendant. The negligence standard
may even keep such evidence out completely as irrelevant or inflammatory.94
Lastly, negligence is the best we can do. It cannot be disputed that a woman's
acts are relevant concerning the reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs.95 We
have argued thus far that the defendant must consider those actions which
91. See, e.g, Mary Ruffolo Rauch, Rape-From a Woman's Perspective, 82 ILL. B.J. 614, 618 (1994)
("By defining force through a man's perception, legal doctrine omits much of what women perceive as
coercion.").
92. See, e.g., People v. Collins, 186 N.E. 2d 30, 33 (I11. 962) ("The underlying thought here is that it is
more probable that an unchaste woman would assent ... than a virtuous woman .. "); People v. Bales, 169
P.2d 262 (Cal. 1946) (overturning rape conviction because lack of resistance could reasonably be interpreted as
consent).
93. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
94. See FED. R. EvtD. 403 (excluding evidence for which unfair prejudice substantially outweighs
probative value).
95. The Federal Rules of Evidence define relevance broadly, such that relevant evidence is that which
"[has] any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
1998l
Yale Joumal of Law and Feminism
manifest her refusal; it is the logical converse to allow him to consider those
actions which manifest her assent. In so doing, he may be constitutionally
entitled to introduce them as evidence in his defense.96 By placing the standard
at one of objective reasonableness, however, the defendant's use of the
prosecuting witness's conduct is limited to what would have led him reasonably
to conclude that the woman had agreed to intercourse. All other conduct, such as
her sexual history, is irrelevant.
97
It may be a curiosity of the law that "no harm, no foul" cases may still be
prosecuted. Consider the woman who truly desires sex, but remains silent, or
assents to intercourse. If the man truly believes he has coerced her into sex, he
could theoretically be convicted. In reality, it is not clear who would bring the
charges. This is at best a trivial case, and will be rarely encountered as a practical
matter. More worrisome is what Estrich refers to as the "male rape fantasy,"98 the
origin of much of the current state of rape law. This may occur only rarely; yet,
as Estrich herself points out, "even if only one of a hundred men, or one of a
thousand, is falsely accused, the question is still how we can protect that man's
right to disprove his guilt." 99 Ultimately, reliance must fall on the court system
and the reasonable doubt requirement to save the defendant from the truly
vindictive former lover. If any given rape trial becomes a contest of credibility, it
is no worse than trials in other criminal contexts. That rape is often a difficult
crime to prove does not mean that we need to change the crime's elements.'00 We
do not change the definition of robbery when some cases boil down to the
defendant's word against the complainant's. It is no answer that such credibility
contests may occur more frequently in rape, where there are usually no witnesses
and evidence is often consistent with consensual sex.101 The infrequency of a
given set of circumstances does not mean we should ignore the principles behind
them, and if we satisfy ourselves that a defendant may properly defend himself
96. See Clifford S. Fishman, Consent, Credibility and the Constitution: Evidence Relating to a Sex
Offense Complainant's Past Sexual Behavior, 44 CATH. U. L. REv. 709, 730 (1995) (arguing that a defendant
has due process, equal protection, and confrontation rights to present evidence of prosecuting witness's
relevant conduct).
97. Dripps points out that this reasonableness standard places rape shield laws on doctrinally strong
ground. Although Dripps uses a different approach, evidence of past sexual conduct is inadmissible under a
reasonableness standard because it is completely irrelevant. "[L]iability would hinge exclusively on the
defendant's conduct and mental state .... [This shift in focus] makes the victim's psychology irrelevant."
Dipps, supra note 37, at 1797-98. Thus, the definition has the distinct advantage of answering the many
constitutional challenges to rape shield laws. See also id at 1798 n.58 (explaining that not all previous conduct
by the prosecuting witness would be irrelevant, but that rape shield laws would be substantially more
consistent with the Constitution).
98. ESTRICH, supra note 52, at 5-6. Estrich defines the "male rape fantasy" as:
The male rape fantasy is a nightmare of being caught in the classic, simple rape. A man engages in
sex. Perhaps he's a bit aggressive about it. The woman says no but doesn't fight very much. Finally,
she gives in. It's happened like this before, with other women, if not with her. But this time is
different: she charges rape. There are no witnesses. It's a contest of credibility, and he is the accused
"rapist."
Id Estrich thus falls into the sexist rhetoric of which she accuses the judiciary.
99. Susan Estrich, Teaching Rape Law, 102 YALE L.J. 509, 518 (1992).
100. See ESTRICH, supra note 52, at 21.
101. See id.
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from false accusations of robbery, we must be equally satisfied that he can do so
when falsely accused of rape.
In summary, then, the second element of rape is defined as acting negligently
against the will of the prosecuting witness. Negligence is measured against the
standard of a reasonable person's actions. This element is reached only if the
strict liability element of nonconsent is not fulfilled.
V. USE OF FORCE
It is clear, now, why force is not an element of this crime. As a strict liability
element, nonconsent requires nothing more than the victim's refusal and the
defendant's continuing with the act to constitute culpability. Force is
unnecessary, and would indeed eviscerate the concept of giving effect to the
woman's words. Similarly, the second element, examining the defendant's
reasonableness toward the woman's willingness, has no need of a force
requirement. Although in reality a nonconsensual or unwilling rape act cannot be
completed without some form of coercion or force, these are often difficult or
impossible to prove. 10 2 The introduction of those elements also carries attendant
difficulties; some courts used to require proof of injury to the woman in order to
fulfill the force element. 10 3 In any event, force or coercion are tangential to the
inquiry of the defendant's culpability, so the requirement of their proof is an
inequity in law.
In addition, there are so many ways in which sex can be involuntarily
coerced that to include "force" as part of the definition of rape is underinclusive.
Some courts have attempted to rectify the situation by expanding the definition
of "force," going so far as to include the act of penetration as sufficient to satisfy
the element. 10 4 Although this occurs most often in cases where the victim is
drugged or otherwise unconscious, 105 it demonstrates that defining rape in terms
of force is highly problematic.
This is not to say that force and coercion are wholly irrelevant to the inquiry.
They may still fulfill an evidentiary purpose. The connections between force,
unwillingness, and mens rea are not to be denied; they are simply to be
categorized as evidence and elements, respectively. Furthermore, different levels
102. See id. ("Unless the victim actively resists, her clothes may be untom and her body unmarked.").
103. See Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 777, 799 (1988) ("Many forcefully argued that the resistance requirement was especially harsh on victims
because it prescribed a course of action that significantly increased their chances of suffering additional
physical injury."); Beth C. Miller, A Comparison of American and Jewish Legal Hews on Rape, 5 COLUM. J.
GENDER & LAW 182, 198 n. 100 (1996) (citing cases in which defendant was acquitted on the grounds that
complainant showed no visible injury); see also QUEEN'S BENCH FOUNDATION, RAPE PREVENTION AND
RESISTANCE 85 (1976) (finding that more than half of sexual assault offenders became more violent when they
encountered resistance).
104. See Renee Madeleine Horn, State v. Moorman: Can Sex with a Sleeping Woman Constitute
Forcible Rape?, 65 N.C. L. REv. 1246, 1252-53 (1987) ("Courts have accepted with unanimity the view that
an act of sexual intercourse constitutes sufficient force to support a charge of rape when the victim is asleep.").
105. See id. at 1250-53 (citing cases).
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of force may be assigned different levels of punishment. 106 States should be free
to gradate their rape-like crimes based on the use of force, or non-violent
coercive means. 10 7 Yet there are those who believe that rape is rape, and its
perpetrators are equally culpable, regardless of whether force was used or
physical harm was caused. 10 8 Those who hold this belief need not dissent from
this Article's more general principles. Even if one views all rapists as having the
same level of culpability, and refuse to gradate based on use of force, one can
still consistently adhere to the rules of mens rea, consent, and willingness.
In summary, force need not and cannot be an element of rape. As an
indicator of willingness or consent, force is unnecessary if other signs are
available, and so need not be a requirement. Furthermore, it is an evidentiary,
rather than an elemental, issue of the crime; the various ways in which sex can
be involuntarily coerced mandate that force not be part of rape's definition.
VI. APPLYING THE DEFINITION
Having established the doctrinal background, the definition of rape can now
be expressed concisely:
Rape is (1) sexual intercourse' 09 (2) with negligence toward the
prosecuting witness's will. Negligence is to be viewed under a reasonable
man standard. If the prosecuting witness refuses sexual intercourse, the
defendant has acted negligentlyper se.
To demonstrate how this proposed definition would be used, three cases shall be
examined: State v. Rusk, 110 State v. Alston,"' and People v. Barnes.112 Rusk and
Alston have been called the "[h]ard cases." ' 1 3 Barnes is frequently included in
casebooks," l4 and presents a strong test for the second element of the crime.
Because the analysis of rape cases is fact-intensive, the facts of each case will be
reviewed in some detail.
106. For an interesting suggestion about including a standard of "dangerousness" in criminal analyses,
see Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability Dangerousness, and Harm: Balancing the Factors on Which our Criminal
Law is Predicated, 66 N.C. L. REv. 283 (1987).
107. Many states already follow this policy. See supra note 21.
108. The theory that harm done should play no role in determining culpability has powerful advocates
beyond the realm of rape law. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 131 (1968) ("Why should an accidental fact that an intended harmful outcome has not
occurred be a ground for punishing less a criminal who may be equally dangerous and equally wicked?").
109. The definition of sexual intercourse itself differs among states. The definition of this element is
beyond the scope of this Article.
110. Rusk, supra note 33.
111. Alston, supra note 33.
112. Barnes, supra note 15.
113. See Estrich, supra note 99, at 513.
114. See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN ETAL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1100-12 (3rd ed. 1996).
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A. State v. Rusk
Pat went out for the night to go barhopping with her girlfriend Terry. At the
third bar, she met the defendant, Edward Rusk. Rusk knew Terry, and, after they
had said hello, he began talking with Pat. In the course of conversation, they
each mentioned having a child, and being separated from their respective
spouses.
Pat eventually told Rusk that she had to go home, and Rusk asked for a ride
back to his own place. Pat agreed, but told him, "I'm just giving a ride home,
you know, as a friend, not anything to be, you know, thought of other than a
ride." Rusk said, "Oh, okay." They left the bar together around midnight.
Pat parked near Rusk's apartment, in an area with which Pat was completely
unfamiliar. She left the engine of her car running, and at least twice declined
Rusk's invitation to go with him to his apartment. Rusk then leaned into her car
and removed the car keys. He then walked to her side of the car, opened the door,
and asked, "Now will you come up?"
Pat testified that she followed Rusk to his apartment out of fear. Without her
keys, in an unknown neighborhood, she testified that she was afraid at that point
that Rusk would rape her. Once inside the apartment, Rusk told Pat to sit down.
Pat sat in a chair beside the bed, while Rusk sat on the bed. When Rusk left
the room for a few minutes, Pat made no effort to leave, but remained seated.
When he returned, Pat asked for her keys back so she could leave. Rusk told her
that he wanted her to stay, and asked Pat to get on the bed with him. He pulled
her by the arms to the bed, and began undressing her. She took off her own
slacks, the rest of her clothes, and Rusk's pants after he told her to do so. The
next part of her testimony is critical:
I was still begging him to please let, you know, let me leave. I said, "you
can get a lot of girls down there, for what you want," and he just kept
saying, "no"; and then I was really scared, because I can't describe, you
know, what was said, at that point-I didn't know what to say; and I
said, "If I do what you want, will you let me go without killing me?"
Because I didn't know, at that point, what he was going to do; and I
started to cry; and when I did he put his hands on my throat, and started
lightly to choke me; and I said, "If I do what you want, will you let me
go?" And he said, yes, and at that time, I proceeded to do what he wanted
me to.
Rusk and Pat had oral sex and vaginal intercourse. Rusk was convicted at trial of
second degree rape, and the conviction was upheld on appeal.
It is tempting to dispose of this case on the basis of nonconsent. That
temptation must be resisted, however; it will be recalled that Pat never actually
told Rusk that she did not want to have sex. She in fact said, "If I do what you
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want, will you let me go without killing me?" The difference is semantic, but
then again, so is the definition. It is a dangerous expansion of the definition of
nonconsent to include statements that do not explicitly and unequivocally refuse
sex. If a strict liabilty element is created, which by itself can convict, that
element must be construed exceedingly narrowly. The same analysis applies to
Pat's initial statement that she was only offering Rusk a ride home.
Pat's statements, however, work against Rusk in the third element. It is by no
means reasonable to believe that a woman who asks whether sex will save her
life is in fact willing to have sex. Furthermore, when Rusk took Pat's car keys,
his actions could not reasonably be deemed as directed toward Pat's willingness.
What about having one's car keys taken is meant to arouse sexual passion?
For his part, Rusk would have to argue his reasonable belief in Pat's
willingness. He could suggest as evidence that she did not leave the apartment
when he left her alone, and she made no effort to contact anyone. Furthermore,
Pat helped undress herself and Rusk prior to asking him whether he would let
her go without killing her. At trial, Rusk testified that the "light choking" was in
fact a caress.
In this case, the evidence seems to point to Rusk having directed his actions
toward overcoming Pat's will. Without her car keys, Pat's failure to escape gave
Rusk no reasonable indication that she wanted sex. Furthermore, asking him
whether he would let her go without killing her, despite having taken his pants
off, would clearly place any reasonable man on sufficient notice. Rusk would
most likley be found guilty of rape.
In upholding Rusk's conviction, the Maryland Court of Appeals made much
of Pat's state of mind, and the fear she felt. With this Article's law of rape, such
an analysis is unnecessary. The focus, as shown, would have been on Rusk's
state of mind, as evidenced by his actions and what he intended to accomplish
by them.
B. State v. Alston
Cottie Brown and defendant Alston had been in a sexual relationship for six
months. They lived together, fought often, and he sometimes struck her. She
would occassionally leave him after being struck, and she did so on May 15. One
month later, Alston found her in front of the technical school where she was
enrolled, and began talking with her. He blocked her exit from the school,
grabbed her by the arm, and insisted on walking with her. As the two walked, he
demanded to know where she was now living, and threatened to "fix her face" if
she did not tell him. Brown testified that she told Alston that the relationship was
over. He demanded the right to have sex with her. They walked together to a
friend's house, where they had gone on previous occasions to have sex. Although
they encountered several people during this time, Brown testified that she said
nothing to any of them because she believed they would not help her.
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When they entered the friend's home, Alston and the friend left together for a
moment. Brown did not leave or make any effort to contact anyone. When
Alston returned alone, he proposed that he and Brown have sex. Brown refused,
and the court found, as a matter of fact, that she had said "no, that I wasn't going
to bed with him." Alston began fondling her. Brown undressed herself when he
told her to, and the two engaged in sex.
Two days later, Alston came to her apartment, and the two had sex again.
Brown testified that she did not fight Alston off, because she enjoyed this
encounter with him.
Alston was convicted of second degree rape at trial, and the conviction was
upheld on appeal. The North Carolina Supreme Court overturned Alston's
conviction, on the grounds that the threats made in public were too far removed
in time and meaning to have induced the later sex act.
Unlike Rusk, the Alston case is a candidate for guilt by nonconsent. When
the court found, as a matter of fact, that Brown had said "no" to sex, that was
sufficient to convict Alston.
The advantage of this Article's definition becomes clear with Alston. The
North Carolina Supreme Court struggled with whether Alston's threats of force
induced Brown to have sex with him. Under this new definition of rape, what
caused Brown to assent is irrelevant; only the defendant's mens rea is at issue.
Thus, if nonconsent were not to be found, the issue would be whether Alston
could reasonably believe that his actions affected Brown's willingness.
Particularly relevant would be his forceful grabbing of Brown's arm, and making
a threat. These seem to indicate his awareness that she did not accompany him
willingly. Had Brown not explicitly refused sex, this case would be much less
clear-cut, and would turn very heavily on the facts in evidence.
C. People v. Barnes
Marsha had known defendant Barnes for about four years. She had
occasionally bought marijuana from him. On May 27, 1982, Barnes called her
on the telephone to invite her to his house. She told him she was unsure, but that
he could call back later. When he called twice in two hours, she agreed to come
over.
Marsha arrived at Barnes' front gate an hour later, where he met her, and
invited her in to smoke marijuana. She refused at first, but ultimately agreed.
After smoking, Barnes began hugging her. She pushed him away, testifying that
she took his actions to be just good-natured playfulness. When he continued, she
said she just wanted to buy marijuana and leave. She said goodbye, and walked
out of the room.
At this point, as Marsha approached the front gate, she testified that Barnes'
demeanor changed. He became angry, saying, "No, you don't go leaving. You
don't just jump up and leave my goddamn house." He yelled at her and argued
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with her, saying she was acting like he was "a rapist or something."
Marsha asked Barnes to open the front gate for her, at which point he "reared
back," which Marsha believed meant he was going to hit her. Barnes then said
he had to get his shoes in order to let her out, and he went back to the house.
Marsha followed him.
After putting on his shoes, Barnes stood up and began to "lecture" Marsha,
threatening her, "telling her he was a man and displaying the muscles in his
arms." At one point, he grabbed her by the collar of her sweater, saying he could
throw her out with one hand.
Marsha testified that she suggested they go to her house in an effort to get
out of his home. Barnes began hugging her, apologizing for "fussing" at her, and
acting affectionately. Soon, he told Marsha to remove her clothes. Marsha
refused, and Barnes told her she was making him upset. Barnes again made a
gesture that Marsha believed meant he was going to hit her. Marsha undressed,
and the two had intercourse for about an hour. Marsha testified that she acted as
though she were a willing participant in an attempt to extricate herself from
Barnes's home. Afterward, Barnes and Marsha fell asleep for an hour or two.
When Marsha awoke, she went home and reported the incident to the hospital.
She reported it to the police the following day.
It is unclear from the record what Marsha said to refuse intercourse.
Assuming that nonconsent is not proven, this case also becomes very difficult.
California law makes the feelings of the prosecuting witness of primary
importance in the analysis." 5 This explains the California Supreme Court's odd
discussion of what Marsha felt the defendant "looked like," and how she felt
threatened when he "displayed the muscles in his arms."
Again, Marsha's feelings are irrelevant under this Article's analysis. What
matters is what the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of her
willingness. Having grabbed her by the sweater collar, it could be inferred that he
was threatening her, an act that no reasonable man would believe could lead to a
willing sex partner. However, Marsha "pretended to be a willing partner."
Although she claimed her motivation was escape, a jury would have to find
whether Barnes could reasonably have been aware of her unwillingness. Her
actions during sex will necessarily cut against Barnes' conviction.
Also important are the motions Barnes made which led Marsha to believe he
would hit her. If the jury found that he meant to threaten her, that could help
convict Barnes.
VH1. CONCLUSION
The above three examples show the power of this definition of rape. A
defendant ignores a woman's "no" at his own peril. If he passes this threshold
point, he must still be found to have given reasonable consideration to her
115. See CAL. PENAL CoDE, supra note 12.
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willingness to have sex. Although the complainant's conduct may still be
brought into issue, it will be only to the extent it could reasonably have
influenced the defendant's perceptions. Finally, such inquiry into the
complainant's actions will be limited by the absence of a force requirement.
What matters is what the defendant thought he was doing, not what the
prosecuting witness perceived.
The law has spent a great deal of time and energy attempting to discern rape
victims' states of mind. The time has come to spend our time in a more fruitful
and relevant endeavor: deciding whether defendants are culpable. Regardless of
the origins of current rape law, it is clearly out of step with other areas of the
criminal law. By establishing that "no means no," and requiring that people at
least act reasonably when dealing with one another, rape law can achieve some
consistency, and, perhaps, some justice.

